Abstract: Using representative data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show that employees in establishments with active owners are less likely to introduce a works council. Moreover, we show that, in case of an introduction, the new works council is less likely to survive if active owners are present. Our findings conform to the hypothesis that active owners oppose codetermination because it reduces the utility they gain from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.
Introduction
German works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for establishment-level codetermination. Recent econometric studies suggest that they have the potential to increase both worker utility and economic performance. These studies typically obtain neutral to positive effects on job satisfaction, employee retention, family friendly practices, training, flexible working time arrangements, capital utilization, performance pay, innovation, investment, and productivity. 1 Works councils even appear to be associated with increased profitability. 2 Yet, despite these favorable outcomes, the overwhelming majority of eligible establishments do not have a works council. Ellguth and Kohaut (2009) estimate that councils are present in only 10 percent of eligible establishments in the German private sector. 3 This gives rise to the question as to what factors contribute to the low incidence of works councils.
Using representative data from the IAB Establishment Panel, our study examines the role of active owners. We find that the presence of active owners in an establishment is associated with a lower probability that employees introduce a works council.
Moreover, we find that, in case of an introduction, the new works council is less likely to survive if active owners are present. Considering the potentially performance enhancing effects of works councils, it does not seem likely that active owners oppose codetermination for economic reasons. The results are rather consistent with the hypothesis that active owners oppose codetermination because it reduces the utility they gain from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.
Previous econometric studies have examined the determinants of works council incidence and the determinants of changes in works council status (e.g., Addison et al. 1997 , Jirjahn 2003a Oberfichtner 2013 ). This study is the first to investigate the survival or failure of newly adopted works councils. An average failure rate of more than 30 percent indicates that newly adopted works councils suffer severely from liability of newness. Our estimates suggest that active owners substantially contribute to this liability of newness. Studies by Jirjahn (2010) and Schloemer-Laufen (2012) have found a negative link between the presence of active owners and the incidence of a works council. Our analysis provides indepth insights into the dynamics behind that link.
On a broader scale, this study also contributes to the literature on employee involvement and organizational change in two ways. First, some studies have examined the failure of employer-initiated employee involvement programs (Chi et al. 2011 , Drago 1988 , Eaton 1994 . By contrast, as the introduction of a works council depends on the initiative of the workforce, our study investigates the failure of employee-initiated codetermination. Second, the literature on organizational change typically focuses on employee resistance to change (Ichniowski and Shaw 1995, Zwick 2002) . Our study considers employer resistance to change.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The institutional framework is described in Section 2. Section 3 provides the background discussion. Section 4 describes the data and the variables. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Framework
Industrial relations in Germany are characterized by a dual structure of employee representation with both unions and works councils. Unions negotiate over wages and general aspects of employment contracts. Works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for establishment-level participation (Keller 2004 , Mueller-Jentsch 1995 .
Their rights are defined in the Works Constitution Act (WCA), which was introduced in 1952 and amended in 1972, 1989, and 2001 . Works councils negotiate over a bundle of interrelated company policies. On some issues, they have the right to information and consultation, in others a veto power over management initiatives, in still others the right to coequal participation in the design and implementation of policy. Their rights are strongest in social and personnel matters such as the introduction of new payment methods, the allocation of working hours and the introduction of technical devices designed to monitor employee performance.
Works councils are institutionalized bodies of worker representation that have functions that are distinct from those of unions. They are designed to increase joint establishment surplus rather than to redistribute the surplus. Works council and employer are obliged by law to cooperate "in a spirit of mutual trust . . . for the good of the employees and of the establishment." They shall collaborate with the serious attempt to reach an agreement and to set aside differences. Works council and employer are not allowed to engage in activities which interfere with the peace within the establishment.
Specifically, the employer must not obstruct the activities of the works council. The WCA explicitly states that members of the works council must not be discriminated against or favored because of their activities.
Works councils are mandatory but not automatic. They shall be elected by the whole workforce of establishments with five or more employees. However, their creation depends on the initiative of the establishment's workforce. To introduce the works council, a meeting of the workforce has to be initiated by at least three employees or by a union that has at least one member in the establishment. At this works meeting, the electoral board is determined by a majority vote of those who are present. If the works meeting fails to elect the electoral board or the meeting has been called for but not held, the labor court appoints a board upon petition. After being established, the electoral board calls the election, implements it and announces the results. Importantly, the WCA states that the employer must not obstruct the election of a works council. Any attempt of the employer to influence the election by threats or promises is unlawful. The cost of the election as well as the cost of operating a works council is borne by the employer.
The members of the works council have a regular term of office of four years. If workers forego the opportunity of reelecting incumbent council members or electing new members after that period, the works council is dissolved within the establishment.
Moreover, and most importantly in our context, a works council can be dissolved at any time if the members of the council decide to resign from office and there are no new members replacing them.
Background Discussion
A reading of the WCA might suggest that the employer has no or little influence on the introduction or dissolution of a works council. However, case studies (Frege 2002 ) and a handful of recent econometric examinations , Dilger 2002 , Jirjahn 2003a , Pfeifer 2011 show that the functioning of codetermination crucially depends on the managerial environment. In some establishments, works council and management are indeed able to build cooperative and trustful employer-employee relationships. Managers with a positive attitude toward employee involvement encourage the works council to participate in a wide range of
decisions. Yet, in other establishments, works council and management have extremely adversarial relationships. Management rather tries to weaken, isolate or ignore the works council.
Industrial relations in establishments without works councils are also heterogeneous and appear to be influenced by managers' attitudes and strategies . In some establishments, management builds cooperative and trustful employer-employee relations even without a works council. Management implements direct modes of communication and participation so that workers do not consider a works council as necessary to speak for them. Yet, in other establishments, managers with a negative attitude toward employee involvement suppress works councils by exerting informal pressure on any worker who shows interest in a council. 4 This is documented by a series of lawsuits and case studies (Bormann 2007 , Koehnen 2006 , Polzer and Helm 2000 , Rheinisches Journalistenbuero 1987 , Rudolph and Wassermann 1996 . Royle (1998) provides a typology of suppression strategies. These strategies include, among others, wrongful dismissals, harassment and threatening behavior, loading off additional work to potential works councilors, and the delay and disruption of the election procedure. Survey evidence conducted by Wilkesmann et al. (2009) suggests that fear of employer reprisal is one reason as to why workers forego the election of a works council.
All in all, the functioning of establishment level codetermination is not entirely constrained by legislation so that management has opportunities to influence the introduction, the operation, and the dissolution of a works council. This brings us to the role of active owners. From a theoretical point of view, active owners can exert an influence for two different motives.
First, owners are the residual claimants of the firm and, thus, have a specific interest in its profitability. Since Berle and Means (1932) , it has been widely recognized that the extent to which the profitability of the firm is taken into account depends on agency problems between owners and managers. If there are no active owners in the firm, it is more difficult to monitor the managers' actions. As a consequence, managers have greater scope to pursue their own goals rather than the owners' interests. They may simply enjoy a quiet life and forego opportunities to increase profit. Yet, if there are active owners in the firm, agency problems should be less severe. Active owners have better access to the information flow within the establishment and have greater control over decision making. This enables active owners to bring the establishment's policy into line with the profit motive. Hence, it depends on the potential profitability effect of codetermination whether or not active owners support the implementation of a works council. From a theoretical viewpoint, this effect is ambiguous (Freeman and Lazear 1995) . On the one hand, works councils can contribute to increased firm performance by helping build cooperation and trust between employer and employees. On the other hand, works councils may use their codetermination rights for redistribution activities in favor of the workers. Recent econometric studies suggest that the first aspect dominates. These studies find that the presence of a works council is positively associated with profitability , Mueller 2011 , Zwick 2007 . 5 Hence, active owners should support codetermination if the profit motive is their dominating motive. We should find that the presence of active owners has a positive influence on both the adoption of a works council and the survival of a newly adopted works council.
Second, as suggested by theoretical analyses (Feinberg 1980 , Olson 1977 , Singell and Thornton 1997 and empirical findings (Benz and Frey 2004, Fuchs-Schuendeln 2009) , active owners gain utility from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.
Active ownership can be seen as a nonpecuniary good that can only be obtained from within the establishment. Active owners not only receive utility from being independent at the workplace but also from "consuming" dominance over their managers and employees (Demsetz 1983) . Thus, to the extent codetermination limits their discretionary power, active owners have a high interest in avoiding a works council even if establishment-level codetermination may have the potential to increase economic performance. This suggests that works councils should be less likely to be adopted in establishments with active owners. Moreover, even if the workforce manages to overcome employer resistance and elects a works council, the new council should be less likely to survive in establishments with active owners. Newly adopted works councils appear to be rather weak and inexperienced ) so that active owners who continue to oppose codetermination can succeed in making workers dissolve the council. In this sense, active ownership may contribute to the liability of newness of works councils within establishments.
Data and Variables

Data Set
We draw data from the IAB Establishment Panel of the Institute for Employment
Research ( Germany. Basic information on the establishment and a core set of questions are asked annually. Additional topics are introduced in specific waves.
As information on the presence of a works council is available on a yearly basis since 1998, we use waves 1998 to 2009. The sample used for our examination is constructed as follows. First, agricultural, non-profit and public-sector establishments are excluded from the analysis. Second, as the WCA only applies to establishments with at least five employees, the analysis is restricted to establishments that meet this minimum size. Third, we drop establishments which continuously had a works council throughout the period considered. This restriction reflects our focus on the introduction of works councils. Fourth, establishments with more than two changes in works council status are excluded from the analysis. If too frequent changes in works council status are reported, it is not clear whether this reflects true changes or measurement error. Our restriction helps reduce the issue of measurement error. Fifth, to further reduce the influence of measurement errors, we also exclude establishments that report the presence of a newly adopted works council for only one single year. While an establishment may falsely report the presence of a newly adopted works council in one year, it is not likely that it falsely reports the presence of a newly adopted council in two or more subsequent years.
Finally, only establishments with at least four consecutive, valid observations are considered. As explained below, this restriction is required to obtain comparable groups of establishments.
Dependent Variables
The definitions of the variables and their descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1 .
Our first dependent variable is a dummy variable for the introduction of a works council.
This variable is equal to 1 if a works council is introduced in the establishment for at least two years. The variable is equal to zero if no works council is introduced. 6 There are roughly 1 percent of establishments with the introduction of a works council.
Our second dependent variable is restricted to those establishments in which a works council is introduced. It is a dummy variable for the dissolution of a newly adopted works council. This variable is equal to 1 if a newly adopted works council is dissolved.
It is equal to zero if the newly adopted works council is not dissolved. Given the definition of our first dependent variable, we consider works council dissolutions that occur after two or more years. The share of establishments with a failure of a newly adopted works council is quite substantial. It amounts to 34 percent.
Note that our definition of the dependent variables requires that we observe establishments with newly adopted works council for at least four years: at least one year in which the establishment initially has no council, two years with the presence of a newly adopted works council, and at least a fourth year in order to observe whether or not the newly adopted works council is dissolved. We obtain a comparable reference group of establishments without works councils by generally focusing on establishments with at least four consecutive, valid observations.
In the initial year 1998, we consider only establishments without a works council.
Hence, our definition of dependent variables implies that we observe the introduction of works councils in each year from 1999 to 2007. The dissolution of newly adopted works councils is observed for each year from 2001 to 2009. For the empirical analysis, we pool the data from the respective years.
Key Explanatory Variable
The key explanatory variable is a dummy for the presence of active owners in the establishment. As discussed, there are two different reasons as to why active owners may influence both the introduction and the failure of a works council. On the one hand, active owners may have a stronger focus on profitability than hired managers. To the extent establishment-level codetermination has the potential to increase profitability, active owners should not only support the introduction but also the functioning of a works council so that a newly adopted council should have a lower probability to fail.
On the other hand, active owners may gain utility from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment. This suggests that they should oppose a works council as codetermination limits their discretionary power. Active owners may not only take action to avoid the introduction of a works council. They may also take action to oppose a newly adopted council in case the workforce manages to overcome their resistance. This implies that active owners contribute to an increased failure of newly adopted works councils.
Control Variables
We control for a series of other factors which may influence a change in works council status. The role of unions is captured by a dummy variable for the coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. Works councils often help unions recruit union members (Behrens 2009 ). Hence, unions should support the implementation of works councils. A union can provide expertise so that it is easier for workers to introduce a works council. Moreover, the WCA provides that a union which has at least one member in the establishment can initiate the introduction of a works council.
We also take into account that workers fearing dismissal or a downgrading of jobs have a specific interest in a works council in order to protect the firm-specific rents they have created by their efforts and human capital investments ). The employment situation is captured by the previous growth rate of employment.
Furthermore, we include dummy variables for a previous employment reduction and a poor employment outlook as particularly adverse conditions should increase workers' desire for representation. Moreover, we control for a reorganization of the establishment.
The reorganization of the establishment may entail a threat to jobs leading workers to introduce a council ).
Personnel turnover may play a different role. A high personnel turnover rate indicates stronger worker preferences for exit than for voice and a less stable workforce which is difficult to organize. We use the churning rate as a measure of personnel turnover. The churning rate captures the share of worker flows that is not part of growth or decline in the size of the establishment workforce. 7 Furthermore, the share of female employees, the share of part-time employees and the share of skilled employees are controlled for. This takes into account that the desire for representation may depend on the structure of the workforce.
The legal form of the establishment is accounted for by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is a limited company or a stock corporation. The owners of limited companies and stock corporations are only liable up to their individual shares. If owners are protected by limited liability, they are more likely to support risky projects (Harhoff et al. 1998 ). Risky projects, in turn, should increase the propensity of risk-averse workers to adopt a works council.
Furthermore, branch plant status may play a role in workers' desire for representation. In a branch plant, the interests of the employees are not only affected by decisions of local managers but also by decisions made by managers of the headquarter ). This entails increased uncertainty from the workers' perspective and, hence, leads to an increased desire for representation. We also control for single establishments. Hence, the reference group consists of establishments that are parent companies with additional subsidiaries.
We consider a series of variables for general establishment characteristics.
Establishment size should have a positive influence on the propensity to adopt a works council. A works council may mitigate transaction costs in larger establishments where the need for communication is likely to be higher. Moreover, the legal rights of works councils are stronger in larger establishments. A variable for establishments located in East Germany is also included in the regressions to take into account that there has been a lower incidence of worker representation in East Germany (Hyman 1996) . Finally, we control for establishment age, industry affiliation and year of observation. Table 2 provides the initial regression results. Column (1) shows the estimates of the determinants of a works council introduction. Column (2) willingness to support risky projects, and threats to jobs increase workers' desire for representation.
Empirical Results
Basic Results
In the regression on works council dissolution, only a few control variables take significant coefficients. A newly adopted works council is less likely to be dissolved if the owners of the establishment are protected by limited liability. Hence, the risk-taking behavior of the owners appears to have a positive influence not only on the employees' propensity to introduce a works council but also on the propensity to continue the operation of the council. Furthermore, personnel turnover emerges as a significant determinant. A newly adopted works council is more likely to be dissolved if personnel turnover is high. This suggests that a less stable workforce may provide insufficient support for the works council.
Most importantly in our context, active owners play a significant role in both the introduction of works councils and the dissolution of newly adopted works councils. The presence of an active owner is a negative determinant of works council introduction. It decreases the probability that a works council is introduced by roughly half a percentage point. For an establishment that would otherwise have the mean probability of 1 percent, this would be 50 percent decrease in the probability of works council introduction. In case that a works council is nonetheless introduced, the presence of an active owner is a negative determinant of its survival. The presence of an active owner is associated with a roughly 25 percentage point higher probability that a newly adopted works council is dissolved. Compared to the mean probability of 34 percent, this is an increase in the probability of dissolution by more than 75 percent.
All in all, our key findings conform to the hypothesis that active owners oppose codetermination because it limits their discretionary power and hence reduces their utility from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment. Active owners do not only take steps to avoid the introduction of a works council. In case that the workers nonetheless manage to introduce a council, active owners also take steps which contribute to the failure of the newly adopted works council. While the WCA states that the employer must not obstruct the election and the activities of a works council, our results suggest that active owners have a substantial influence on the functioning of establishment-level codetermination.
Does the Influence of Active Owners Depend on the Type of Establishment?
In a further step, we examine if the influence of active owners on the introduction and survival of works councils depends on specific establishment characteristics. Previous research has shown that there is a series of potentially moderating establishment characteristics that can influence the functioning of works councils. We examine whether or not these establishment characteristics also moderate the influence of active owners on works council introduction and works council survival. Table 3 In our context, one may hypothesize that expertise provided by unions may help overcome active owners' resistance to works councils. The hypothesis is not consistently supported by our estimates. On the one hand, active owners significantly contribute to the failure of newly adopted works councils only in uncovered but not in covered establishments. This finding conforms to the hypothesis that unions act as a countervailing power to active owners. On the other hand, a significantly negative influence of active owners on works council introduction is found for both uncovered and covered establishments. The influence is of similar magnitude for both types of establishments. This result does not conform to the hypothesis.
Furthermore, we provide separate estimates for establishments in East and West
Germany. The estimates suggest that active owners play a similar role in East and West German establishments. For both types of establishments, they confirm a significantly negative influence on the introduction of works councils and a significantly positive influence on the failure of newly adopted works councils.
There is an ongoing debate as to whether or not the functioning of establishmentlevel codetermination differs by industry (Frick and Moeller 2003, Wagner et al. 2006) .
Against this background, we run separate regressions for establishments in the manufacturing and the service sector. The regressions suggest a similar role of active owners in both sectors. The presence of an active owner is a negative determinant of the introduction of a works council and a positive determinant of the dissolution of a newly adopted works council.
Finally, we follow previous studies on works councils (e.g., Addison et al. 1997 , Gartner et al. 2013 , Huebler 2003 , Jirjahn 2003a , 2003b , Jirjahn and Mueller 2013 , Wagner 2008 ) and exclude very small and very large establishments from the analysis in order to focus on medium sized establishments. We experiment with different definitions of medium sized establishments and provide estimates for establishments with 21 to 100, 21 to 200, and 21 to 500 employees. These estimates confirm a significant influence of active owners on both works council introduction and the failure of newly adopted works councils.
In summary, the estimates shown in Table 3 provide little systematic evidence that the role of active owners depends on specific establishment characteristics. The estimates rather show the same pattern of results for different types of establishments.
The presence of active owners is associated with a lower probability of works council introduction and with a higher probability of a dissolution of a newly adopted council.
Conclusions
The WCA provides that employees alone should decide whether or not they want a works council. The employer must not obstruct the election or the activities of a council. Yet, our findings suggest that the employer de facto has a strong influence on the employees' decision. The presence of active owners in the establishment is associated with a lower probability of introducing a works council and a higher probability of dissolving a newly introduced council. Considering the neutral to positive effects of works councils on establishment performance, the negative influence of active owners is difficult to explain by economic motives. The negative influence rather conforms to the hypothesis that active owners oppose codetermination as it limits their discretionary power and hence reduces their utility from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.
Several general conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, previous studies suggest that the works council status of an establishment is relatively stable in the long run. Our analysis shows that not only a low rate of works council introduction but also a high failure rate of newly introduced works councils contributes to that stability.
The presence of active owners plays a role in both rates. It reduces the rate of introduction and increases the rate of failure.
Second, some jurists have noted that workers' rights provided by the WCA are only incompletely enforceable (e.g., Daeubler 2001) . The finding that active owners reduce the chance of successfully introducing a works council is in line with this notion.
One reason for the incomplete enforceability may be that hidden actions of employers are difficult to verify in court.
Third, previous econometric studies have tried to understand the functioning of establishment-level codetermination by examining its economic consequences. Our findings suggest that non-economic factors may also play an important role. The maintenance of power for its own sake appears to be one motive as to why active owners oppose codetermination. This calls for a more detailed consideration of non-economic factors in econometric analyses. Such an extension would allow combining a systematic quantitative analysis with a more comprehensive perspective on the functioning of establishment-level codetermination.
Finally, we note that future research could fruitfully examine the specific steps active owners take in order to discourage workers from electing and operating a works council. The IAB data do not contain information on these steps. So we must leave this topic until representative data with detailed information are available. Method: Probit. The table shows the estimated coefficients on the dummy variable for the presence of an active owner. Results on the control variables are suppressed to save space. Marginal effects are in square brackets and z-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level by using the Huber-White sandwich variance estimator. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level.
